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Trading Mortgages for Judgments Against Community Property 
 
ROGER BERNHARDT 
Family Code §1102 (former CC §5127), which requires the signatures of both husband and 
wife for the leasing, conveying, or encumbering of community real property, is fundamentally 
incompatible with Fam C §910, which holds a couple’s community property liable for the debts 
of either spouse, even though not joined in by the other. That incompatibility and absurdity is 
dramatically demonstrated by the following example. An unsecured lender to one spouse (i.e., 
the other spouse has not signed the unsecured note) can get a money judgment against the 
defaulting debtor spouse and record a judgment lien against the community property family 
home under Fam C §910, whereas a secured lender to that same spouse (i.e., the lender whose 
note and deed of trust on the house was not signed by the other spouse) gets no security interest 
whatsoever in the house—not even on half of the community property—because the lack of two 
signatures renders the deed of trust entirely invalid under Fam C §1102. 
Background: Droeger 
In Droeger v Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 C3d 26, 283 CR 584, reported at 14 CEB 
RPLR 260 (Oct. 1991), one spouse had given her law firm a security interest in two properties to 
secure its fees in her divorce action. The husband challenged the encumbrances under former CC 
§5127 (Fam C §1102) because he had not consented. The law firm argued that the encumbrances 
should be valid at least as to the wife’s half interest in the community property. The court, 
however, held that the absence of the other spouse’s signature voided the instrument entirely, not 
just half way. But Droeger did not decide what was to happen next: What becomes of the 
creditor who has just lost its security because of the missing signature? Lezine v Security Pac. 
Fin. Servs., Inc. (1996) 14 C4th 56, 58 CR2d 76, reported at 20 CEB RPLR 41 (Jan. 1997), now 
answers that question: loss of the security is possibly the best thing that can happen to the 
creditor. 
Lezine 
In Lezine, the husband—who had forged his wife’s signature on a quitclaim deed, which made 
him appear to be the sole owner of the couple’s residence—executed deeds of trust on the house 
to two different creditors (one of which was not a party because it abandoned its appeal). After 
the wife learned of her husband’s dealings, she successfully sued to invalidate the liens under 
former CC §5127 (Fam C §1102), but in the same action the court gave the creditors money 
judgments against the husband. Unknown to the wife, the creditors recorded their judgment liens 
in the county of the couple’s residence, thus creating liens against the house. Three months later, 
in the wife’s separate dissolution action, the court awarded her the residence as her separate 
property, and assigned the two lender debts to her husband. When she later tried to refinance the 
property, she learned about the judgment liens. She then moved for clarification of the prior 
judgment voiding the deeds of trust, arguing that Droeger compelled the conclusion that the 
judgment liens should not attach to the same property on which the creditors’ deeds of trust had 
been voided. 
The California Supreme Court confirmed that when a creditor’s deed of trust is executed only 
by the husband, that creditor loses its security because the wife did not sign, but the creditor in 
Lezine does not lose its claim, and thus is entitled to a money judgment against the husband for 
the loan. The court further held that, once the judgment was recorded, it became a lien on the 
very same house because Fam C §910 holds the community liable for the husband’s debts. After 
the house was awarded to the wife in the dissolution proceedings, she took it subject to the 
judgment lien, which covered the same loan that had been secured by the deed of trust she had 
previously successfully challenged! The result may seem weird, but the logic is hard to avoid 
(and the court’s ruling was unanimous). The legislature could overturn it, but first they would 
have to come up with an alternative acceptable to most sides, which is unlikely. 
Importance of Timing 
Timing may have had a lot to do with the Lezine outcome. Under Fam C §916 (former CC 
§5120.160), community property awarded to a spouse in a dissolution action is no longer liable 
for marital debts assigned to the other spouse, subject, however, to existing liens. Ms. Lezine lost 
because she filed separate actions for invalidation of the deeds of trust and for dissolution of the 
marriage, and let the first go to judgment several months before the second. Thus, the deeds of 
trust had already been vacated and a money judgment entered for the creditors and recorded 
before the house was awarded to her as her separate property in the dissolution action. The 
Lezine court speculated that the same result probably would have occurred had she asked for all 
her relief in one action. Had she been able to file separate actions and have the outcomes occur in 
reverse order, however, the house should have lost its community character (i.e., she already 
would have been awarded the residence as her separate property in the dissolution action) before 
there were money judgments to record resulting from the invalidation action. In that case, the 
house should not have been liable for the debts of her (former or current) spouse under Fam C 
§916. Ensuring such a result for the innocent spouse will be a challenge for matrimonial counsel 
in future litigation. 
Family Code §1102(d) requires a nonconsenting spouse to file her action within one year after 
the deed of trust has been recorded, which may abridge the luxury of waiting until the divorce is 
final before cleaning up the title. (Also, when one spouse conveys community property by deed 
rather than by a deed of trust, the nonconsenting spouse will have to invalidate the deed before 
the divorce award in order to get the asset characterized as community property at all.) 
Matrimonial counsel will have to devise ways to slow the invalidation action enough that it 
always lags behind the dissolution action, lest they be accused of malpractice for permitting 
property to be dissipated to creditors rather than preserved for the innocent spouse. 
Creditor Strategies 
Can the creditor—who wants the reverse result—initiate and accelerate its own action in order 
to convert its defective instrument (deed or mortgage) into a recordable money judgment while 
the property is still in the community? The creditors in Lezine could not have been expected to 
act first because they believed that the property belonged solely to the husband based on the 
forged quitclaim deed; but the law firm in Droeger certainly had to know that the security for 
their deed of trust was community property—they were, after all, handling the divorce. Before 
Droeger, the law firm could hope that the deed of trust was valid at least as to the consenting 
spouse’s one-half community property interest, as some courts had held (Mitchell v American 
Reserve Ins. Co. (1980) 110 CA3d 220, 167 CR 760), which made taking the security worth the 
gamble; after Droeger, the firm would know that the deed of trust was bad, and therefore they 
would not necessarily be motivated to pursue it. After Lezine, however, a creditor ought to 
appreciate that a bad deed of trust can be converted into a good judgment by appropriate action. 
One-Action Rule Considerations 
The surest way to get a recordable money judgment is to sue for money. The one-action rule 
(CCP §726) says you cannot do that if your debt is secured. However, the one-action rule does 
not apply if the creditor’s security is legally “worthless” (see California Mortgage and Deed of 
Trust Practice §§4.6–4.8 (2d ed Cal CEB 1990)), and Droeger seems to have made deeds of trust 
signed by only one spouse entirely worthless. The fact that the security is worthless should give a 
creditor both a way around the one-action hurdle and a justification for suing even if note 
payments are not in arrears. So even if the nonconsenting spouse does not sue to invalidate the 
lien, maybe the creditor can treat it as invalid anyway under Droeger and Lezine. 
(I don’t know how this plays out if a year has already passed since the document was 
recorded. Under Fam C §1102, the nonconsenting spouse has only one year to sue to invalidate 
the instrument. If the spouse does not file a timely invalidation action, maybe the creditor can no 
longer rely on the worthless security exception. But then, the creditor with valid security hardly 
needs to rely on the exception.) 
Denial of Relief to Creditor at Fault? 
Lezine involved two secured lenders, one of whom may have known of the husband’s forgery. 
This factor may have led the Lezine court to emphasize that it was not determining the rights of a 
creditor who knew of the marriage or the Fam C §1102 violation. 14 C4th at 71 n8. Does that 
mean the Droeger law firm might not be able to get a judgment lien because it must have known 
that its deed of trust was on community property? Both lenders in Lezine, however—the one with 
knowledge as well as the one without—got recordable money judgments replacing their 
mortgages. 
Which takes us back to the one-action rule. The rule traditionally is stated as prohibiting a 
secured lender from suing on its note for a personal judgment except when its security has been 
rendered valueless without “fault.” If a creditor knows that another signature is necessary, is that 
creditor “at fault” for purposes of the one-action rule, as Lezine’s footnote hints? If so, will it 
lose both its security and—as suggested by Security Pac. Nat’l Bank v Wozab (1990) 51 C3d 
991, 275 CR 201 (reported at 14 CEB RPLR 22 (Jan. 1991))—its underlying debt as well? In the 
rarefied atmosphere of one-action land, anything is possible. 
Conclusion 
Independent of these speculations, a creditor should rarely want to have its security invalidated 
in order to get a judgment lien instead. The judgment lien may provide an escape from some of 
the antideficiency rules (e.g., purchase money limitations under CCP §580b and fair value 
requirements under CCP §580a), but its priority vis-à-vis other liens will start from the date the 
creditor recorded its judgment rather than the date the former (voided) deed of trust was 
executed. Also, the creditor would totally lose the right to foreclose under a power of sale clause 
in the mortgage. 
